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1.  Introduction 
 
In addition to the various studies on Venture Capital financing in the US, recent empirical 
research has analysed the markets for Private Equity and Venture Capital (VC) in several 
established European countries. The emerging literature refrains from transferring findings 
from the US VC industry one-to-one to Europe and pays growing attention to the individual 
characteristics of VC markets in different regions (JENG and WELLS, 2000). Nevertheless, 
the evidence on less developed markets with a blossoming need for growth capital has largely 
been  neglected.    The  lack  of  additional  comprehensive  studies  analyzing  the  investment 
behavior of Venture Capitalists (VCs) in smaller markets calls for further research in this 
field. As MANIGART  et al.   (2002) point out there is  a wide range  of economic, legal, 
institutional and cultural differences influencing the environment in which VCs operate. Thus, 
the miscellaneous and comprehensive conclusions drawn on the North American VC market 
are not necessarily applicable to the European VC industry as a whole. This paper aims at 
filling this gap by investigating the behavior of VCs in Switzerland with respect to financing 
mechanisms employed and the extent to which collaboration between VCs is used to cope 
with informational barriers. It is the first of its kind to explicitly focus on the Swiss market 
and adds to the growing empirical literature on staging and syndication in European countries. 
 
Concerning the role of VCs, one can presume that the use of a staged financial structure can 
be as important as the  pure provision of capital. Overcoming the problem of asymmetric 
information and monitoring the activities of portfolio firms can be valuable. Thus, I analyze to 
which extent VCs investing in Switzerland make use of staged capital infusions.  I start by 
documenting the driving forces of staging for VCs operating in Switzerland. I find that among 
the different affiliations of VC investors in Switzerland especially independent investors make 
more extensive use of stage financing. Moreover, the results suggest that staging is employed 
as a tool for mitigating risks. Firms that focus more extensively on certain stages employ on 
average more financing rounds.  
 
Recent  literature  has  shown  that  firms  can  join  forces  with  other  partners  to  combine 
resources and capabilities in order to overcome information asymmetries and gain access to 
deal flow. I investigate the reasons behind the formation of such syndicates and estimate the 
effect that cooperation of financial institutions has on the value and prospects of the funded 
portfolio  company.  I  find  that  foreign  investors  make  more  extensive  use  of  syndication 
efforts when investing in the Swiss market. Syndication allows the foreign investors to spread 
their capital over a larger number of deals without diluting effort available to the other funded 
firms. Moreover, syndication can serve as an entrance strategy to new markets. In addition, I 
find that VCs which use staged capital infusions are more prone to join forces with partners. 
This  is  in  line  with  the  argumentation  of  FLUCK,  GARRISON  and  MYERS  (2005) 
suggesting that the syndication of VC investments could alleviate agency problems between 
the VC and the entrepreneur and consequently, VCs that make use of staging should also be 
more open to syndication. 
 
Concerning the value added effect of syndication and staging activities I find that Swiss VCs 
seem  to  have  problems  either  in  exiting  their  deals,  or  might  even  exhibit  difficulties  in 
providing the necessary value added in managing their investments. Overall VCs that are 
more locally embedded (as measured by a locality dummy) do exhibit lower success rates for 
their investment portfolio. Moreover, I show that syndication positively impacts the success 
rate of VCs providing evidence on a value added effect of VC Syndication.  
   3 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 I will summarize the related 
literature. Chapter 3 introduces the data set used in this paper. In Chapter 4 I will discuss the 
factors impacting the staging and monitoring of VC investments and present and discuss the 
implications of the regression results. Chapter 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Related Literature 
 
There  is  widespread  evidence  on  the  financing  behavior  of  VCs  in  established  markets. 
SAHLMAN (1990) points out that when the investment is staged and the capital infusions 
take place in smaller increments, rather than involving a large upfront payment, the prospects 
of the firm are re-evaluated on an ongoing basis. FLUCK et al. (2005) point out that staged 
financing benefits VCs in two ways. First of all, it can block the entrepreneur's incentive to 
continue investing in bad projects to generate private benefits and allows the VCs to exploit 
the venture's real option value by being able to stop investing once the venture turns out to be 
less successful than expected. WANG and ZHOU (2002) also argue that staging reduces the 
cost associated with bad information (the real option value of abandonment) and decreases the 
agency costs of moral hazard. As such, staging can solve different purposes in early and later 
rounds. 
 
The  two  commonly  employed  mechanisms  of  staged  financing  are  milestones,  where  the 
financed firm receives a new capital injection contingent upon certain criteria being met, and 
round financing where no explicit commitment for an additional round of financing is made. 
TALMOR and CUNY (2005) analyze various factors impacting the choice between round 
financing and milestones. They find that if the role of the venture capitalist is more important 
than the entrepreneur, milestone financing is more efficient than round financing and vice 
versa. BIENZ and HIRSCH (2005) analyze the role of milestones versus round financing in 
the  context  of  German  VC  agreements.  In  round  financing  each  new  capital  infusion  is 
negotiated  separately,  whereas  in  milestone  financing  the  decision  whether  to  inject  new 
capital is made contingent on the portfolio company meeting predefined targets in terms of 
product development or financial figures. BIENZ and HIRSCH arrive at the conclusion that 
the decision to stage is determined by the inherent uncertainty and the degree of asymmetric 
information.  The  form  of  staging,  however,  is  determined  by  the  predictability  of  the 
development process and the anticipated bargaining power of the involved parties.  
 
The role played by VCs in the financing process goes beyond the mere provision of money. 
BRANDER  et  al.  (2005)  point  out  the  value  adding  effect  of  syndication  activities  and 
AUDRETSCH and LEHMANN (2004) empirically show that the syndication of investments 
can lead to higher sales growth. Recent studies argue that there are two main motives that 
complement each other when explaining why VCs choose to co-invest with a partner: the 
risk-mitigating perspective and the resource-based perspective [HOPP and RIEDER, 2006; 
BRANDER et al., 2002; MANIGART et al., 2005). The Risk Mitigating Perspective sees 
syndication as a mean for VCs to build up a well-diversified portfolio and reduce risk without 
reducing  return,  while  the  resource-based  approach,  sees  the  VC  market  as  a  pool  of 
productive  resources  in  which  VCs  can  access  resources  of  partners  through  syndication 
(MANIGART et al., 2005; BYGRAVE, 1987).  FLUCK et al. (2005) present a model of VC 
contracting that incorporates moral hazard, and asymmetric information problems. They show 
that later stage syndication of VC investments alleviates the agency problems between the 
VCs and the entrepreneurs. Syndication reduces the monopoly power of the financing firm 
and thus induces the entrepreneur to put in more effort. FLUCK et al. point out that the 
commitment to syndicate can protect the entrepreneur from dilution and thus mitigates the   4 
problem of hold-up. The commitment to syndicate therefore assures a higher effort of the 
entrepreneur and yields more favorable financing terms in return. 
 
 
3.  The Data 
 
In order to make inferences on the staging and syndication behavior I make use of a data set 
on  VC  transactions  in  Switzerland.  The  sample  consists  of  423  VC  transactions  in 
Switzerland within the period 1989 – 2005, whereas the majority of the deals undertaken is 
concentrated in the later years. The transactions have been compiled by using public sources 
and the Thomson Venture Economics (TVE) Database. I have identified the involved parties 
in each transaction and the corresponding information on the VC along with the funded firms. 
The result is a deal survey exhibiting who has funded a new company and was joined by 
which partner. Moreover, I collected information about each financing round. Hence, I can 
identify which VCs have made an investments into a target firm at which point in time.  
 
In order to give an idea about the distribution of investments over time and industries I used 
the information from TVE to identify the sector of a particular venture. Here I make use of the 
Venture  Economics  Industry  Classification  (VEIC)  -  a  Venture  Economics  proprietary 
industry classification scheme. I divided the Medical/Health classification in two separate 
categories. I created categories for Software and Internet firms to illustrate the importance of 
investments into "New Economy" firms over the period. In addition, I collected information 
about the different stages of development when an investment has been made. TVE gives 
information  about  five  different  categories:  Start  Up/Seed,  Early  Stage,  Expansion,  Later 
Stage and Other. Similar to GOMPERS (1995) who labels the categories for bridge, second 
and  third  stage  financing  as  "Late  Stage"  financing,  I  combined  the  TVE  categories 
Expansion, Later Stage and Other to form a new category, that I also label "Late Stage". As 
there is no clear distinction between Expansion financing, that almost always occur in later 
phases, and other financing activities, that namely concern bridge financing or special purpose 
financing, from the "Later Stage" category this combination appears to be the most reasonable 
classification scheme. 
 
Table 1 shows that the number of transactions increased until the year 2001 with a peak of 99 
VC  deals.  The  years  2002-2004  have  seen  a  steady  level  of  investment  activity  of  30 
transactions. With respect to the industries financed one can see that Internet firms have been 
attractive during the dot.com boom but have not been of interest to VCs ever since. The same 
effect  can  be  found  for  Software  firms  that  peaked  during  the  years  1999  and  2000  and 
steadily declined to 6,5% of the total transactions undertaken in 2004 (from about 30% in 
1999 and 24% in 2000). The relative importance of Biotech, Medical and Pharmaceutical 
firms has experienced a constant interest from the side of the VCs over the late 90s and the 
importance  has  even  increased  with  the  ending  of  the  dot.com  boom  in  1999/2000.  The 
number of deals in the “Old Economy” industries such as Industrial Products and Electronics 
has plunged in the late 90s but has gained significance over the recent years.  
 
Table 1 also provides evidence about the distribution of financing events across stages of 
development. One can infer that the focus of the VCs has been more on Later Stage financing 
until the year 1999. Start Up and Seed financing remained on a relatively modest level and 
only gained significance with the beginning of the new millennium. This also emphasizes the 
relatively juvenile market in Switzerland, where the initial investment steps concentrated on 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2  5 
shifted  their  focus  to  earlier  stages  of  the  investment  life  cycle.  In  the  later  years  the 
investments have been made roughly equally in all stages of development.  
 
 
    [Insert table 1 about here] 
 
 
For the scope of the upcoming analysis I included the characteristics of the VCs to see how 
those factors impact the decision to stage an investment or make use of extensive partnering. I 
classify the companies as being an independent venture capitalist if there are no strings to 
other firms or banks attached. Secondly, I classify VCs as banking dependent when a private 
bank has  founded them or a private bank holds more than 50% of the shares. Thirdly, I 
classify VCs as public if the shares are hold by either a government or by a governmental 
public fund.  Additionally, I included corporate VCs when the fund has strings to a large 
corporation. In order to control for locality effects I included a dummy variable equaling one 
when the venture vapitalist has an office in Switzerland from which it  operates and  zero 
otherwise. This “Swiss Office” dummy is used to estimate the impact that familiarity and 
proximity to the local market and its particularities might have on the decision to co-invest or 
make  use  of  monitoring  and  control  mechanisms  in  order  to  overcome  information 
asymmetries.  
 
Table 2 reports the characteristics of the VCs in the sample. One can infer that among the 
firms that provided capital to young and innovative firms, independent VCs outnumber the 
other firms active in the Swiss market. Moreover, those firms turn out to focus more on 
specific  industries.  TVE  provides  information  about  the  investment  focus  for  the  various 
investors in the sample. TVE distinguishes between firms that have a focus on Medical/Health 
and  Pharmaceutical  companies,  Information  Technology  or  Non-High  firms.  The  TVE 
information on focus industries reveals that among independent investors, about a third of the 
firms focus on investments into Information Technology and roughly five percent focus on 
Non-High Technology and ten percent on Medical firms. Among the categories roughly a 
third of the VCs active in the Swiss market operate from a Swiss Office, with corporate 
investors being mostly from a foreign origin.  
 
Column (7) in table 3 reports the average number of financing events by VCs from each 
category. Once it comes to an investment, corporate VCs have provided the largest number of 
rounds on average followed by independent VCs. Interestingly public VCs have on average 
participated only in a single financing round  when an investment is made. The  extent of 
staging therefore differs among the VC provider categories. Later on I will try to shed more 
light on the staging patterns that emerge and investigate what impacts the decision to stage 
capital infusions. For further analysis I also describe the VCs by their syndication ratio that is 
expressed by the ratio of syndicated investments to the total number of deals. The higher the 
syndication ratio of an investor, the more he tends to invest in portfolio companies that are 
funded through a co-investment. A syndication ratio of "0" indicates that the specific investor 
invested exclusively on his own and was not involved in any co-investment. Table 2 reveals 
that  joint  investment  activity  is  more  pronounced  among  corporate  and  public  investors, 
whereas independent VCs exhibit a lower syndication ratio and tend to invest to a lesser 
extent with a partner.  
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4  6 
Additionally I have included variables describing the VC investors further. TVE provides 
information about Capital under Management ("Capital") for the VCs, along with information 
on  the  overall  sum  invested  in  Switzerland  ("Sum")  and  the  Swiss  investment  size  as  a 
percentage of the overall investment activity world-wide ("Percentage"). Moreover, I have 
included the number of funds managed totally for the VCs to proxy for size and experience 
beyond  the  pure  capital  available  for  a  single  fund.  From  table  2  one  can  infer  that 
independent  and  banking  VCs  have  the  largest  amount  of  Capital  under  Management 
measured in Million Euro. Moreover, independent and corporate VCs invested the largest 
amount of capital in Switzerland, and also invested (along with public investors) the largest 
chunk  of  their  funds  into  the  Swiss  market.  In  terms  of  funds  managed  independent  and 








  VC Characteristics and the Need for Staging and Monitoring 
 
In order to test which VCs are more likely to invest in stages I estimate an OLS regression 
with the VC provider characteristics as the explanatory variables and the average number of 
financing  rounds  per  VC  provider  as  the  dependent  variable.  The  explanatory  variables 
include the VC categories introduced in chapter 2 (i.e. Independent, Banking, etc.), a variable 
indicating the focus of the VCs (i.e. whether the firm concentrates their investments into Non-
High Tech firms, Information Technology firms, or Medical firms). In order to control for 
locality effects I include a dummy variable equaling one if the VC operates from a Swiss 
Office and zero otherwise. GOMPERS (1995) has pointed out that problems of asymmetric 
information  become  more  pronounced  with  less  proximity  between  the  VCs  and  the 
investment target. It might be interesting to see how these factors impact the extent of staging 
activities. In addition, I included variables indicating the Capital under Management, the size 
of previous deals done in Switzerland, the number of funds managed and the volume of total 
transactions done in Switzerland as a percentage of the worldwide volume of transactions. 
Moreover, I calculated the concentration on certain stages as well as the concentration on 
industries for the VCs to see how the portfolio influences the need for staging. Therefore the 
closer the index is to one, the more the deals are concentrated within a few industries (stages). 
The total number of investments undertaken by the VCs is also included into the regression to 
test for the influence of size and experience on the use of staged financing.   
 
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
 
The results are reported in table 3. One can infer that among the VC categories only the 
coefficient associated with the dummy variable for independent VC investors is positive and 
significant among all five regression specifications (at least at the 5% level) indicating that in 
comparison with public investors (as this dummy has been omitted from the regression to 
avoid perfect collinearity) independent investors make more extensive use of stage financing. 
The coefficients associated with the other dummy variables are not significant at conventional 
levels.  Thus,  banking  and  corporate  investors  do  not  differ  in  their  use  of  staged  capital 
infusions from public investors. With respect to the number of investments the data reveals Table 3:
VC Characteristics and Average Number of Financing Rounds
Dependent Variable: Average Number of Financing Rounds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Banking 0.1036 -0.0092 0.2364 0.1587 0.0901 -0.0449
(0.435) (0.918) (0.065)  (0.228) (0.546) (0.812)
Independent 0.2432 0.2958 0.4392 0.3437 0.2987 0.1987
(0.036)   (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.005)    (0.218)
Corporate 0.2060 0.2647 0.3107 0.2938
(0.406) (0.334) (0.284) (0.298)
Swiss O ce 0.0765 -0.0648 0.0494 0.0866 0.0965 -0.0841
(0.485) (0.535) (0.695) (0.468) (0.397) (0.510)
Investments 0.2301 0.2262 0.1317 0.2323 0.1559 0.0705
(0.069)  (0.082)  (0.476) (0.076)  (0.219) (0.678)
Stage Concentration 0.1706 0.1250 0.1675 0.1725 0.1758 0.1350
(0.001)    (0.004)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.000)   
Industry Concentration -0.2447 -0.3188 -0.2137 -0.2211 -0.3574 -0.4492
(0.483) (0.350) (0.633) (0.528) (0.283) (0.309)
Non High-Tech -0.0634 -0.0536 -0.1442 -0.0869 -0.1177 -0.0233
(0.623) (0.350) (0.434) (0.521) (0.446) (0.879)
Information Tech -0.0117 -0.1146 -0.1021 -0.0383 -0.0367 -0.0747
(0.911) (0.373) (0.429) (0.743) (0.341) (0.521)
Medical -0.1748 -0.3498 -0.1049 -0.2100 -0.1645 -0.2052
(0.266) (0.047)   (0.546) (0.226) (0.341) (0.136)
Capital -0.0263 -0.1264
(0.496) (0.012)  
Sum 0.1203 0.1502
(0.055)  (0.016)  
Percentage -0.0652 -0.2057
(0.704) (0.209)
Funds Managed 0.0892 0.0196
(0.073)  (0.079) 
Number of obs 227 174 170 199 201 145
F-Test 5.24 5.22 4.85 5.76 5.29 4.99
R2 0.2901 0.2556 0.3546 0.1863 0.3319 0.3851
The table reports an OLS regression model using robust Standard Errors (Huber/White/sandwich) estimating
the impact of Venture Capital provider characteristics on the average number of ﬁnancing rounds in which
capital is provided to the investment target. The sample for the ﬁrst regression includes 227 Venture Capital
providers that have made at least one investment in the period 1989-2005. For regression (2) I additionally
included the Capital under Management for the VC ﬁrm. This variable enters the regression as the log.
Moreover, I have included a dummy variable indicating the investment focus of the VC ﬁrm, i.e. whether
the focus is on Non High-Tech, Information Technology, Medical and Life Sciences Products, or no speciﬁed
focus at all. For regression (3) the sample has been reduced to 170 VC ﬁrms. The variable Corporate has
been dropped for this regression as not enough data points were available. Regression (3) uses the total Sum
of investments made in Switzerland by the respective VC provider (enters the regression as the log), whereas
regression (4) includes the investments made in Switzerland as a percentage of the overall sum of investments
made. Regression (5) uses the number of Funds managed by the respective VCs as an additional explanatory
variable. Regression (6) includes all variables simultaneously. The table reports the coe cient estimate along
with the p-values in parentheses. Intercepts are not shown. The variables Public VC and ”No Investment
Focus” have been dropped to avoid perfect collinearity.
*, **, *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
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that there is a positive and significant coefficient in three out of six regression specifications, 
albeit only at the 10% level. There seems to be some indication that experience (as measured 
by the number of deals) has a marginal positive impact on the observable staging behavior. 
However, the effect is not robust to alternative specifications used.  
 
With respect to the use of stage financing TYKVOVA (2004) argues that local (in her case 
German) VCs usually invest in later stages and typically also carry out fewer investment 
rounds.  This  effect  can,  however,  not  be  confirmed  with  the  Swiss  data.  The  coefficient 
associated with the dummy variable indicating whether a VC operates from a Swiss office is 
not found to be statistically significant in all six regressions indicating that VCs that have a 
closer proximity to the market do not differ in their use of stage financing from VCs that do 
not operate from a Swiss office.  
 
Among  the  variables  indicating  the  investment  focus  of  the  VCs  one  would  expect  that 
focusing firms are less prone to staging as a risk management device, as the knowledge and 
expertise acquired in the core markets render an extensive use of stage financing to overcome 
informational asymmetries obsolete. However, although the coefficients have a negative sign, 
which would be in line with this argumentation, none of the dummy variables is significant at 
conventional levels. Thus, there is no evidence that VCs focusing on specific industries differ 
in  their  use of  staging  mechanisms.  In  addition,  the  presence  of  industry  knowledge  that 
substitutes  for  staging  is  also  not  confirmed  with  respect  to  the  industry  concentration 
variable. Again, there is no significant evidence to confirm that firms that invest a larger 
portion of their investments in a specific industry are less inclined to stage the corresponding 
investments.  One  could  expect  that  inexperienced  VCs  are  not  only  likely  to  be  more 
uncertain  about the prospects of the venture, but might also be more unfamiliar with the 
particularities  of  the  Swiss  market  itself.  The  coefficient  associated  with  the  variable 
"Percentage invested in Switzerland" is, however, not found to be significant indicating that 
VCs that invest more of their funds in Switzerland do not differ in their use of staging from 
less active VCs.  
 
Nevertheless,  with  respect  to  the  concentration  of  stages  invested,  one  can  infer  that  the 
coefficient associated with this variable is positive and significant (at the 1% level) across all 
regression specifications. The results suggest that firms that focus on certain stages employ 
more  financing  rounds  on  average.  In  order  to  keep  the  entrepreneurs  on  a  tighter  leash 
staging mechanisms can be employed to reduce the downside exposure for the investments 
made. Moreover, staging reduces the cost associated with bad information (the real option 
value of abandonment) and decreases the agency costs of moral hazard. Accordingly, firms 
that concentrate their investments into specific rounds can mitigate risks more effectively 
when employing staging mechanisms.  
 
In addition, I find that the overall sum invested in Switzerland has a positive coefficient (at 
the  10%  and  5%  level,  respectively)  indicating  that  firms  with  more  funds  invested  in 
Switzerland are more likely to make use of staging. This indicates that more experienced VCs 
are more likely to make use of staging, supporting the results found in TYKVOVA (2003). 
This effect is strong with respect to the other size variable of the VCs, the number of funds 
managed,  that  also  exhibits  a  positive  and  significant  coefficient  (at  the  10%  level).  The 
coefficient associated with the variable “Capital under Management” is only significant in one 
of the two regressions.   
  
 
  The Decision to Join Forces among providers of Venture Capital   8 
 
VC financing involves not only money for funding growth opportunities but also includes 
help  in  guiding  managerial  decisions.  This  characteristic  is  often  referred  to  as  "Smart 
Money". As some VCs lack resources and investment capabilities to deal with the difficulties 
and problems faced in VC financing it could therefore be beneficial to invest jointly with 
other partners. In order to test the impact of VC characteristics on the propensity to co-invest I 
estimate a tobit regression using the previously defined syndication ratio as the dependent 
variable. As the explanatory variables I use the dummy variables indicating the VC type (i.e. 
banking,  independent  etc.)  along  with  the  locality  dummy  that  equals  one  when  the  VC 
operates from a Swiss office. Again, I use the focus variables of the VCs as explanatory 
variables. In addition, I use the average number of financing rounds employed for the VCs to 
test  for  interaction  effects  of  staging  and  syndication  activities.  If  the  commitment  to 
syndicate  can  mitigate  the  hold-up  problem  and  align  the  interests  of  the  VCs  and  the 
entrepreneur (as argued by FLUCK et al. (2005)), the firms that stage and monitor more 
extensively  should  also  be  more  inclined  to  involve  partners  in  the  financing  process. 
However, when firms join forces, where each firm contributes its share and might concentrate 
on specific rounds, it could well be that there are preferences among the VCs for certain 
stages or rounds. The extent to which firms collaborate could be influenced by the investment 
focus  and  the  experience  gained  in  certain  stages.  In  order  to  control  for  specialization  I 
include the two concentration measures for stages of development and  industries into the 
analysis to see whether firms with a more pronounced focus on industries and stages might be 
less inclined to syndicate with a partner. The results are reported in table 4.  
 
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
 
BERNILE et al. (2005) point out that the variations in VC quality might be attributable to the 
quality  of  general  and  limited  partners  as  well  as  to  the  affiliation  of  the  fund 
(corporate/government).  Table 4, however, indicates that among the VC affiliation dummies 
none of the coefficients is significant at conventional levels. This suggests that VC affiliation 
itself  does  not  impact  the  decision  to  syndicate  with  a  partner  solely.  The  coefficient 
associated with the locality dummy is negative and significant in four out of six regression 
specifications (at varying levels of confidence). This indicates that foreign VC investors make 
more extensive use of syndication efforts when investing in the Swiss market. Concerning the 
need  to  syndicate  for  foreign  investors  GOMPERS  (1995)  points  out  that  entrepreneurial 
firms that are more disperse require more effort to monitor in order to mitigate information 
asymmetries. The size of a portfolio for VCs investing across borders is likely to be smaller as 
the value added effect is diluted by the more intense monitoring activities. Syndication allows 
the foreign investors to spread their capital over a larger number of deals without diluting 
effort  available  to  the  other  funded  firms.  More  importantly,  syndication  can  serve  as  an 
entrance strategy to new markets in order to generate sufficient deal flow. Amortizing the 
locality advantages of closely situated Swiss VCs and participating in their specific market 
knowledge might be an even more important reason. Most likely, foreign VCs generate a 
portfolio effect by investing smaller amounts of money into a larger number of companies and 
benefit through the pre-selection of other involved VCs. 
 
With respect to the need to syndicate from a resource point of view one could argue that 
syndication becomes more important for the VCs when investing outside the predominant 
investment activities in order to get access to deal flow and to reduce the level of asymmetric 
information in the VC – Entrepreneur relationship due to unfamiliarity with the local market. Table 4:
VC Characteristics and Syndication Activities
Dependent Variable: Syndication Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Banking -0.7735 -1.2236 -0.2833 -0.4757 -0.8289 -1.068
(0.583) (0.406) (0.753) (0.719) (0.549) (0.238)
Independent -1.7976 -1.8772 -1.1555 -1.1388 -1.6081 -1.704
(0.182) (0.192) (0.136) (0.361) (0.221) (0.044)   
Corporate -0.1747 0.2436 0.8360 0.6772
(0.915) (0.886) (0.610) (0.685)
Swiss O ce -1.3185 -0.7967 -1.6677 -1.4429 -1.1082 -1.4839
(0.053)  (0.180) (0.003)    (0.047)   (0.083  (0.006)   
Investments -0.3426 -0.4844 -0.3301 -0.5001 -0.3605 -0.0994
(0.683) (0.478) (0.613) (0.512) (0.650) (0.861)
Stage Concentration -0.1247 -0.1452 0.0473 -0.1167 -0.3605 0.0132
(0.393) (0.244) (0.740) (0.377) (0.429) (0.918)
Industry Concentration 1.1209 0.3061 0.3310 0.2915 0.7838 0.6114
(0.600) (0.860) (0.845) (0.879) (0.702) (0.687)
Non High-Tech -1.7910 -1.4155 -2.0423 -1.3415 -1.5490 -1.833
(0.100)  (0.114) (0.012)    (0.170) (0.128) (0.011)  
Information Tech -0.5447 -0.1988 -0.1021 -0.1911 -0.4202 0.1248
(0.371) (0.709) (0.429) (0.740) (0.477) (0.777)
Medical 1.1875 1.5993 1.1109 1.7761 1.4402 1.0923
(0.242) (0.090)  (0.169) (0.084)  (0.134) (0.139)
Average Rounds 1.2352 1.1196 0.0737 1.1179 1.0662 0.3375
(0.057)  (0.047)   (0.855) (0.060)  (0.072)  (0.404)
Capital 0.3803 0.3165





Funds Managed .3860 -0.0201
(0.177) (0.516)
Number of obs 227 174 170 199 201 145
 2   Test 25.06 30.80 40.45 24.69 26.84 43.47
Pseudo R2 0.0278 0.1058 0.1694 0.0785 0.0835 0.2035
The table reports a Tobit regression model estimating the impact of Venture Capital provider characteristics
on the syndication ratio. The syndication ratio measures the number of joint investments as a percentage of
the total number of transactions undertaken. The sample for the ﬁrst regression includes 227 Venture Capital
providers that have made at least one investment in the period 1989-2005. Additionally, the regressions include
information on the average number of round ﬁnancing used for the investments made, a Herﬁndahl measure
of concentration for the industries invested in as well as for the concentration on stages (i.e. Start Up/Seed,
Early Stage and Late Stage). For regression (2) I additionally included the Capital under Management for the
VC ﬁrm which enters the regression as the log. Moreover, I have included a dummy variable indicating the
investment focus of the VC ﬁrm, i.e. whether the focus is on Non High-Tech, Information Technology, Medical
and Life Sciences Products, or no speciﬁed focus at all. For regression (3) the sample has been reduced to
170 VC ﬁrms. The variable Corporate has been dropped for this regression as not enough data points were
available. Regression (3) uses the total Sum of investments made in Switzerland by the respective VC provider
(enters the regression as the log), whereas regression (4) includes the investments made in Switzerland as a
percentage of the overall sum of investments made. Regression (5) uses the number of Funds managed by the
respective VCs as an additional explanatory variable. Regression (6) includes all variables simultaneously. The
table reports the coe cient estimate along with the p-values in parentheses. Intercepts are not shown. The
variables Public VC and ”No Investment Focus” have been dropped to avoid perfect collinearity.
*, **, *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively. 7  9 
Therefore, one would expect that VCs investing outside the scope of their normal investment 
activities  need  to  rely  more  extensively  on  syndication.  Nevertheless,  the  coefficients 
associated  with  the  “Percentage  invested  in  Switzerland”  and  the  “Sum  invested  in 
Switzerland” are not found to be significant. Firms that are more acquainted with the local 
particularities do not differ in syndication effort from inexperienced counterparts. The effect 
can also not be confirmed by the two concentration measures. Here one could expect to see 
firms that are more familiar with certain stages or that acquired expertise within a certain 
industry  relying  less  on  syndication.  I  do  find  that  neither  the  coefficient  for  the  stage 
concentration  nor  the  coefficient  associated  with  the  industry  concentration  is  significant. 
Firms that concentrate their investments do not differ in their reliance on syndication efforts. 
 
However, I find that the coefficient associated with the variable “Capital under Management” 
is positive and significant (at the 1% and 5% level, respectively).  For larger VCs the lower 
incentive to syndicate from a resource driven perspective seems to be outweighed by the 
potential  to  benefit  from  a  more  central  network  position  within  the  VC  community. 
HOCHBERG  et  al.  (2006)  argue  that  the  influence  a  VC  derives  from  having  many 
syndication partners is useful even if the VC does not syndicate a specific investment. Thus, 
investment targets benefit from being backed by a VC that has many ties within the industry 
and over other well-connected investors. Building up a reputation via a track record of deals 
enables the VCs to occupy a central position within the VC community. Moreover, better-




With respect to the average number of rounds included I find that the coefficient is positive 
and significant in four out of six regression specifications. This suggests evidence for the 
argumentation of FLUCK et al. (2005) that firms which realize the benefit of staging might on 
the  same  turn  realize  the  value  added  in  financing  start  ups  through  the  involvement  of 
partners. In order to create complementarities in managing and advising the funded firms as 
well as by combining financial resources firms therefore join forces with partners. In addition 
to this, FLUCK et al. (2005) point out that the commitment to syndicate can  protect the 
entrepreneur from dilution and thus mitigates the problem of hold-up. Consequently, VCs that 
make use of staging are also more open to syndication. 
 
 
  Monitoring, Syndication and the Impact on Successful Venturing Activities 
 
Recent studies stress the importance of financing mechanisms for carrying out an investment 
deal  successfully  and  also  point  out  the  value  enhancing  effect  of  syndication  activities. 
                                                 
1 The empirical method chosen in this paper analyzes syndication from the side of the VCs solely. In order to test 
whether syndication is associated with a higher financing need for the funded firm I estimated a regression 
including  industries  dummies  as  well  as  the  size  of  the  funded  firm  (measured  by  the  log  of  sales  and 
employees). Despite the industry dummy for Biotech, Electronics and Software none of the other variables turns 
out to be significant. It is, however, still possible that there is endogenous matching, i.e. larger VCs choose fims 
with a higher financing need, so that the effects across VCs wash out. The classical way to circumvent the 
endogeneity  problem,  would  be  to  make use  of  an  instrumental  variable  that  would be  independent  of  the 
outcome (syndication) but related to VC characteristics (such as experience or capital under management) in 
order to account for the VCs choosing the funded firms. However, the complexity of the underlying decisions 
makes it difficult to find a suitable instrument. SORENSEN (2006) for example suggests the use of a two-sided 
matching model in order to overcome the problem of finding a suitable instrument. However, the computational 
tractability of the structural equations only allow for an analysis of initial investments rather then subsequent 
rounds (with a higher financing need). In order to mitigate potential problems I have included various variables 
in my analyses that should alleviate a potential bias.  
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LERNER (1994) documents a positive effect of joint decision making on mitigating agency 
conflicts between the VC and the entrepreneur. The evaluation of the venture proposal by 
different VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces adverse selection. Consequently, the 
decision making process becomes more efficient and leads to better results if the project is 
only undertaken when approved by two or more parties. Hence, one would expect to see a 
positive effect of syndication efforts on company performance as argued in BRANDER et al. 
(2002) and documented in AUDRETSCH and LEHMANN (2004).  
 
With respect to the effect of staging on company performance FLUCK et al. (2006) argue that 
the  commitment  to  syndicate  assures  a  higher  effort  of  the  entrepreneur  and  yields  more 
favorable  financing  terms  in  return.  In  addition,  they  put  forward  the  argumentation  that 
syndication gives better incentives to the entrepreneur and consequently increases the value of 
the venture.  Moreover, DAVILA et al. (2003) emphasize the different roles of VC staging. 
First round investments are intended to provide capital to a cash constraint entrepreneur while 
late stage financing is intended to overcome information asymmetries and to mitigate the 
agency conflicts present in the relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur. The early 
stage investment is therefore characterized by uncertainty over the future outcome and VCs 
can limit their downside exposure by not committing all capital upfront and keeping their 
option to abandon alive. Once the portfolio firm makes progress in developing products and 
management  structures,  the  VC  can  permanently  update  its  information  and  can  commit 
further capital to promote growth.  
 
In this sense one would expect to see a value enhancing effect of staging and syndication 
efforts alike for the portfolio companies. In order to test for the relationship between the 
extent of staging and syndication and the chances of investment success I estimate a tobit 
regression with the success rate of the VCs as the dependent variable. Similar to HOCHBERG 
et al. (2005) the success rate measures the percentage of deals that have been successfully 
exited. Here I take the percentage of investment targets that have been successfully sold via a 
trade-sale, an acquisition or exited via an IPO to the total number of deals undertaken.  As the 
explanatory variables I use the category dummies, the focus of the VCs, the locality dummy 
(Swiss Office), the measures of stage and industry concentration and the variables describing 
the Capital under Management, the total Sum invested in Switzerland, the percentage of the 
portfolio invested in Switzerland and the total number of funds that have been managed by the 
corresponding VC. Table 5 reports the results. 
 
 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
 
Again, one can infer that none of the VC affiliation dummies is significant indicating that 
affiliation itself has no impact on the chances of success for a positive exit. Neither the stage 
concentration  nor  the  industry  concentration  variable  exhibit  a  significant  effect  on  the 
success rate. VCs that are investing more in certain stages do not improve their chances of 
successful exits in comparison to firms investing more broadly. Moreover, no effect can be 
found  for  firms  focusing  on  specific  industry  segments.  None  of  the  focus  dummies  is 
significant at conventional levels. With respect to the variables indicating the size of the VC I 
find that neither the number of investments undertaken, nor the capital under management or 
the sum invested in Switzerland have an  effect on the success rate of  VCs. The variable 
“Funds  managed”  is  positive  and  marginally  significant  in  one  out  of  two  regression 
specifications, indicating that firms that have managed more funds on average over the past 
have higher chances of successfully exiting their investments made.  
 Table 5:
VC Syndication, Staging Activities and Investment Success
Dependent Variable: Success Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Syndication 0.5149 0.4274 0.3754 0.4949 0.4369 0.3142
(0.003)    (0.018)    (0.091)  (0.003)    (0.010)    (0.138)
Average Rounds -0.0300 -0.0424 -0.0723 -0.0893 -0.0780 -0.0987
(0.733) (0.639) (0.475) (0.320) (0.388) (0.331)
Banking -0.0096 -0.0071 0.0954 -0.0330 -0.1358 0.2223
(0.978) (0.984) (0.799) (0.921) (0.694) (0.330)
Independent -0.3816 -0.3422 -0.2654 -0.3470 -0.4576 -0.0745
(0.273) (0.325) (0.472) (0.300) (0.182) (0.682)
Corporate -0.4691 -0.4376 -0.4545 -0.5499
(0.232) (0.264) (0.229) (0.155)
Swiss O ce -0.1737 -0.1338 -0.2114 -0.0561 -0.1197 -0.1416
(0.093)  (0.210) (0.060)   (0.616) (0.249) (0.243)
Investments -0.3426 0.1179 0.0981 0.1456 0.1127 0.1249
(0.683) (0.281) (0.446) (0.171) (0.287) (0.328)
Stage Concentration -0.0001 -0.0186 0.0109 0.0584 0.0249 0.0415
(0.999) (0.852) (0.917) (0.557) (0.798) (0.702)
Industry Concentration 0.0968 0.1410 0.1429 0.1231 0.1457 0.1869
(0.740) (0.635) (0.658) (0.663) (0.612) (0.578)
Non High-Tech -0.0933 -0.1994 -0.1508 -0.1465 -0.2349 -0.3422
(0.767) (0.546) (0.647) (0.643) (0.464) (0.337)
Information Tech 0.0907 0.0787 0.0980 0.0553 0.0563 0.0510
(0.406) (0.474) (0.383) (0.602) (0.599) (0.652)
Medical 0.0756 0.07923 0.0568 -0.0034 0.0802 0.03750






(0.042)   (0.760)
Funds Managed 0.0950 0.0536
(0.087)  (0.509)
Number of obs 61 59 55 61 61 55
 2   Test 26.17 24.86 20.38 30.47 29.18 22.60
Pseudo R2 0.3127 0.3132 0.2803 0.3692 0.3536 0.3107
The table reports a Tobit regression model estimating the impact of Venture Capital provider characteristics
on the Success Rate of the VC ﬁrms. The Success Rate is measured as the percentage of investments that
have been successfully exited through a trade-sale, an acquisition by another party or via an IPO. The sample
for the ﬁrst regression includes 227 Venture Capital providers that have made at least two investment in the
period 1989-2005. Additionally, the regressions include information on the average number of round ﬁnancing
used for the investments made, a Herﬁndahl measure of concentration for the industries invested in as well as
for the concentration on stages (i.e. Start Up/Seed, Early Stage and Late Stage). Moreover, I have included
the Syndication Ratio for each VC and the Average Number of Financing Rounds in order to estimate the
e ects joint investment e ort and sophisticated Financing arrangements used. For regression (2) I additionally
included the Capital under Management for the VC ﬁrm which enters the regression as the log. Moreover, I
have included a dummy variable indicating the investment focus of the VC ﬁrm, i.e. whether the focus is on
Non High-Tech, Information Technology, Medical and Life Sciences Products, or no speciﬁed focus at all. For
regression (3) the sample has been reduced to 55 VC ﬁrms. The variable Corporate has been dropped for this
regression as not enough data points were available. Regression (3) uses the total Sum of investments made in
Switzerland by the respective VC provider (enters the regression as the log), whereas regression (4) includes
the investments made in Switzerland as a percentage of the overall sum of investments made. Regression (5)
uses the number of Funds managed by the respective VCs as an additional explanatory variable. Regression
(6) includes all variables simultaneously. The table reports the coe cient estimate along with the p-values in
parentheses. Intercepts are not shown. The variables Public VC and ”No Investment Focus” have been dropped
to avoid perfect collinearity.
*, **, *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
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Interestingly, the coefficient associated with the locality dummy “Swiss Office” is negative 
and significant. Swiss VCs therefore seem to have problems either in exiting their deals, or 
might  even  exhibit  difficulties  in  providing  the  necessary  value  added  in  managing  their 
investments. However, interpretations have to be made with a note of caution, as the variable 
is  only  significant  in  two  out  of  five  regression  specifications.  Nonetheless,  this  effect  is 
supported  by  the  negative  and  significant  coefficient  (at  the  5%  level  in  regression 
specification  four,  but  not  in  six)  associated  with  the  variable  “Percentage  invested  in 
Switzerland”. Therefore it might be worthwhile to further investigate the issue raised here in 
order to shed light on the potential causes and consequences of the lower success rates of 
more locally embedded VCs. Seemingly, we can infer that VCs that are more active in the 
Swiss market are less successful in exiting their deals. Alternatively, one could argue that the 
higher level of experience in investing for foreign VCs coming from more established VC 
environments leads them to better select deals and manage them accordingly.  
 
The results presented in table 5 show that syndication has a positive and significant effect 
(across all regression specifications) on the success rate of VCs. Here I find evidence on a 
value added effect of VC Syndication. This could on the one hand speak for LERNER’s 
Selection  Hypothesis  at  the  pre-investment  stage  and  alternatively  for  the  claim  of 
BRANDER et al. (2002) that syndication provides a benefit in terms of value adding at the 
post-investment stage.  LERNER (1994) suggests that the evaluation of the same venture 
proposal by different VC companies operating in a syndicate reduces the potential danger of 
adverse selection. The combined effort to assess the quality of a venture helps VC investors to 
overcome  informational  asymmetries  as  the  entrepreneurs  typically  know  more  about  the 
investment opportunity they seek funding for and might overstate the attractiveness of his 
business proposal (SORENSEN and STUART, 1999). BRANDER et al. (2002) argue with a 
value added stemming from the involvement of other VC partners and the complementarity of 
skills. An investor acts according to the Value Added Hypothesis when he believes that the 
involvement of other venture capitalists would add some value to the venture. The benefit of 
involving co-investors is derived from heterogeneous skills and information different VCs can 
contribute to the management of the funded firm. 
 
The previous results from the syndication analysis showed that local firms do rely to a lesser 
extent on syndication. In addition, I find that the success rates of Swiss VCs tend to be lower 
than for comparable foreign investors. Here it might be interesting to further investigate why 
Swiss firms refrain from joining forces with partners. Likely, the relatively inexperienced 
firms do not realize the value adding stemming from joint investment activity. Bearing in 
mind that the Swiss market is, by and large, characterized by a much lower number of deals as 
compared to other continental VC markets the lack of experience by local market participants 
might have an influence on the observable financing and syndication behavior.  
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5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In  this  paper  I  analyse  the  market  for  Venture  Capital  in  Switzerland  along  several 
dimensions. With respect to the use of staging mechanisms I investigate to which extent it is 
used  in  venture  financing  to  reduce  investment  risks  and  to  overcome  information 
asymmetries.  I  find  that  among  the  different  affiliations  of  VC  investors  in  Switzerland 
especially independent investors make more extensive use of stage financing. Moreover, firms 
that focus more extensively on certain stages employ on average more financing rounds. In 
order to keep the entrepreneurs on a tighter leash staging mechanisms can be employed to 
reduce the downside exposure for the investments made. In addition, I find that firms with 
more funds invested in Switzerland are more likely to make use of staging. This effect is 
strong with respect to the other size variables of the VCs included. With respect to the use of 
syndication as a mechanism to lever upon capabilities of other partners in the selection and 
management of investments I find that foreign investors make more use of syndication efforts 
when investing in the Swiss market. Syndication allows the foreign investors to spread their 
capital over a larger number of deals without diluting effort available to the other funded 
firms Moreover, syndication can serve as an entrance strategy to new markets  
 
In addition, I find evidence that firms, which realize the benefit of staging, do also become 
conscious of the value added in financing start ups by involving partners. In order to create 
complementarities in managing and advising the funded firms as well as to combine financial 
resources, VCs join forces with partners. Concerning the value added effect of Syndication 
and Staging Activities I find that Swiss VCs seem to have problems either in exiting their 
deals, or might even exhibit difficulties in providing the necessary value added in managing 
their investments. Overall I show that VCs that are more locally embedded (as measured by 
the Swiss office dummy) do exhibit lower success rates for their investment portfolio. The 
outcomes are surprising to the extent that one would expect that VCs that are located closer to 
their  portfolio  companies  have  a  competitive  advantage  in  comparison  to  their  foreign 
competitors. Moreover, I show that syndication positively impacts the success rates of VCs 
finding  evidence  on  a  value  added  effect  of  VC  syndication.  However,  to  make  clearer 
distinctions between the origin of a VC and the likelihood of success an analysis in the style 
of MAULA and MURRAY (2000) using "hard" data such as IPO valuations or investment 
outcomes would be necessary to possibly quantify the added value through syndication. In 
general the relationship between syndication and firm value of the funded firm is far from 
being clarified. 
  
The lack of additional comprehensive studies on the syndication behaviour of European VCs 
calls for further research in this field. As MANIGART et al. (2002) point out; there is a range 
of economic, legal, institutional and cultural differences influencing the environment in which 
VC organisations operate. Thus, the miscellaneous and comprehensive conclusions drawn on 
the North American VC market are not necessarily applicable to the European VC industry. 
Additional comparisons on the syndication practices in Europe, the US and Asia are needed 
and an interesting avenue for future research. Further studies are also needed to reveal if the 
European VC industry is becoming more uniform and standardised and to what degree trans-
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SUMMARY 
This paper analyses the Determinants of Venture Capital (VC) Staging and Syndication in 
Switzerland.  I  find  that  among  the  different  affiliations  of  VC  investors  in  Switzerland 
especially  independent  investors  make  more  extensive  use  of  staged  capital  infusions. 
Moreover, the results suggest that staging is employed as a tool for mitigating risks in VC 
financing. In addition, I find that Syndication can serve as an entrance strategy for foreign 
VCs.  Furthermore, I find evidence that firms, which realize the benefit of staging, do also 
become  conscious  of  the  value  added  in  financing  Start  Ups  by  involving  partners. 
Consequently, VCs that make use of staging are also more open to syndication. With respect 
to the value-added of Co-Investment behavior, I show that syndication positively impacts the 
success rate of a VC, whereas VCs that are more locally embedded do exhibit lower success 




Dieser Beitrag analysiert die Determinanten des Syndizierungsverhalten und der Einsatzes 
von gestaffelten Kapitalzuführungen (Staging) bei der Venture Capital (VC) Finanzierung in 
der Schweiz. Ich zeige, dass unter den unterschiedlichen Arten von Beteiligungsfirmen in der 
Schweiz  insbesondere  unabhängige  Investoren  deutlich  stärker  auf  gestaffelte 
Kapitalzuführungen  zurückgreifen.  Darüber  hinaus  zeigen  die  Ergebnisse,  dass  staging 
zumeist  als  Mittel  zur  Abmilderung  von  VC-Finanzierungsrisiken  verwandt  wird.  Des 
weiteren zeigen die Resultate, dass die Syndizierung von VC Transaktionen eine Möglichkeit 
zum Markteintritt für ausländische VC Gesellschaften bietet. Ferner gibt es Evidenz, dass VC 
Gesellschaften die den Vorteil von staging erkennen, in der Regel auch verstärkt auf den 
Mehrwert  durch  die  Einbindung  von  Partnern  zurückgreifen.  Infolgedessen  sind  VC 
Gesellschaften die vermehrt staging einsetzen auch offener für Kooperationen mit anderen 
VC  Gesellschaften.  Bezüglich  der  Existenz  eines  Mehrwerts  durch  die  Einbindung  von 
Partnern zeigen die Ergebnisse, das Syndizierung einen positiven Effekt auf die Erfolgsrate 
der VC Gesellschaften hat, wobei lokal ansässige VC Gesellschaften in der Regel geringere 




Cet article analyse les déterminants du financement échelonné ou consortial des sociétés de 
Capital-Risque (CR) en Suisses. Parmi les différentes affiliations des investisseurs du CR en 
Suisses,  je  trouve  que  les  investisseurs  indépendents  utilisent  de  manière  plus  intensive 
l´échelonnage du capital. Par ailleurs, les résultats suggèrent que l´échelonnage est employé 
comme un instrument pour minimiser les risques de financement des sociétés de CR. En plus, 
le financement consortial peut servir comme une stratégie d´entrée pour les offreurs étrangers 
de CR. En outre, il s´avère que les sociétés de CR, qui utilisent un financement échelonné sont 
également  plus  ouvertes  au  financement  consortial.  Concernant  la  valeur  ajoutée  du 
comportement des co-investissements, je montre que tandis que le financement consortial a un 
impact  positif  sur  le  taux  de  succès  pour  l´offreur  de  CR,  les  sociétés de  CR,  ayant  une 
activité  plus  localisée,  présentent  un  taux  de  succès  inférieur  pour  leurs  portefeuilles 
d´investissement.       14 
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